

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2313
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11149

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PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: RESTRICTED PLENARY, JULY 18

CTB MESSAGE NO.264

1. SUMMARY: AT SUBJECT PLENARY WARNKE (US) REVIEWED CTB PORTION OF VANCE-GROMYKO MEETING, US-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF RECENT DAYS AND SUMMED UP PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS. PETROSYANTS (USSR) EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH WARNKE'S SUMMARIZATION AND SET FORTH CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS STRESSING IN PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF EARLY RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS OF SCOPE AND DURATION. HE EXPLAINED SOVIET NSS PROPOSALS AND EXPRESSED HOPE FOR EARLY CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AT RESTRICTED PLENARY JULY 18, WARNKE, IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST BY EDMONDS (UK), BRIEFLY REVIEWED CTB PORTION OF VANCE-GROMYKO JULY 13 CONVERSATION AND SUMMARIZED WHERE WE STOOD AS RESULT OF SEVERAL DAYS OF US-USSR BILATERALS.

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HE CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AND HAD AGREED TO TASK POLITICAL WORKING GROUP WITH DRAFTING OF ARTICLE I. WITH REGARD TO DURATION, WARNKE NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAD ON TABLE PROPOSAL FOR A 3-YEAR TREATY WHICH WOULD BECOME OF UNLIMITED DURATION IF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ADHERED, WHILE US/UK HAD PROPOSED A FIXED TERM, 5-YEAR

TREATY. WARNKE NOTED PROPOSALS SOVIETS HAD MADE WITH REGARD TO NSS IN BILATERALS AND SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR US TO HAVE SOME CLARIFICATIONS. THE US HAD MADE VERY SPECIFIC AND DETAILED PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS, EQUIPMENT, DATA TRANSMISSION AND INSTALLATION SCHEDULE AND NEEDED SIMILARLY DETAILED EXPLANATIONS OF SOVIET IDEAS. THEIR PROPOSALS WERE STILL SOMEWHAT VAGUE. HE NOTED THAT PETROSYANTS HAD MADE POINT THAT CLARIFICATION OF DURATION ISSUE WOULD FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NSS POSITION. WITH REGARD TO THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING ON INITIATION OF OSIS, WARNKE SAID THAT, WHILE IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THE MATTER REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

3. PETROSYANTS RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH WARNKE'S EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID WE HAD REACHED AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH REQUIRED FULL CLARITY ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE I. THE USSR FAVORED A COMPLETE BAN ON ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND IT WAS NOW CLEAR THE US AGREED. HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THERE WAS COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING BUT IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO REFLECT THAT UNDERSTANDING IN SPECIFIC TREATY LANGUAGE BECAUSE RESOLUTION OF MANY OTHER ISSUES DEPENDED ON THE WAY IN WHICH THIS WAS SETTLED.

4. TURNING TO DURATION, PETROSYANTS NOTED THAT THE US AND
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UK HAD RECENTLY PROPOSED FIVE YEARS AND THE SOVIETS HAD INDICATED THEY WERE PREPARED TO REGARD THIS POSITIVELY PROVIDED THE US AND UK TOOK CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES, PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION. IF, HOWEVER, THE US AND UK WERE STILL UNCERTAIN OF THEIR POSITION ON DURATION, HE URGED THEM TO REACH A DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR THE SOLUTION OF ALL OTHER QUESTIONS. PETROSYANTS SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A REVIEW CONFERENCE IN THE TREATY'S FINAL YEAR, BUT WERE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT DECISIONS SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD TAKE. THEY COULD NOT AGREE THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE TO REPLACE THE TREATY WITH ANOTHER TREATY THAT MIGHT NOT BE COMPREHENSIVE IN SCOPE. US/UK PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE REPLACEMENT TREATY TO HAVE A DIFFERENT SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AS WELL AS TO DIFFER IN ITS OTHER PROVISIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE BE PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND THE TREATY DEPENDING ON THE TESTING OF NON-PARTIES. THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A SETTLEMENT ON THIS BASIS.

5. TURNING TO VERIFICATION, PETROSYANTS EMPHASIZED THAT

VERIFICATION SHOULD BE PRIMARILY BY NTM AND ISDE. HE THEN NOTED THAT THERE WAS ALREADY CONSIDERABLE AGREEMENT ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS BUT COMPLAINED THAT US/UK PROPOSALS WERE EXCESSIVELY DETAILED. HE SAID THAT WHILE THE USSR DID NOT CONSIDER NSS NECESSARY THEY HAD BEEN WILLING TO CONSIDER THE US PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, STATIONS BEING DEVELOPED BY THE US WOULD NOT BE READY UNTIL OCTOBER AND THE FIRST TEST RESULTS WOULD BE AVAILABLE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR. THE FATE OF SUCH AN IMPORTANT

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UNDERTAKING AS A TEST BAN SHOULD NOT DEPEND UPON WHEN NSS WOULD BE READY, OR HOW EFFECTIVE AND RELIABLE IT WOULD PROVE TO BE IN OPERATION. AS A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A PHASED APPROACH. IN THE FIRST STAGE, VERIFICATION WOULD BE BY NTM SUPPLEMENTED BY ISDE. AT THE SAME TIME, TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE, THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT COULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC INFORMATION FROM AN AGREED NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL STATIONS. SUCH EXCHANGE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE FIRST STAGE UNDER THE ISDE PROCEDURES. IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE IMPROVED EQUIPMENT WITH AGREED CHARACTERISTICS, INCLUDING AUTHENTICATORS, WOULD BE INSTALLED AT THESE STATIONS. THE DATA WOULD BE RECORDED, AND TAPES WOULD BE EXCHANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROCEDURES. PETROSYANTS SAID THAT HE BELIEVED MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS. HE SUGGESTED THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS

PROCEED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING
THAT THE NUMBER OF NSS COULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY AFTER THE
DURATION ISSUE WAS SETTLED. PETROSYANTS CONCLUDED THAT
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HE BELIEVED FINAL AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE SOON.

6. EDMONDS (UK) RESPONDED BRIEFLY AGREEING TO THE
SUGGESTED WORK PROGRAM AND SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED THE
SOVIET ARTICLE I DRAFT OF FEBRUARY 9 COULD BE USED AS A
BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF SCOPE. HE URGED THE SOVIETS TO BE
MORE PRECISE WITH REGARD TO NSS PHASING.

7. RESPONDING TO PETROSYANTS' COMMENTS ABOUT THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE, WARNKE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE TESTING BY
NON-PARTIES WOULD BE THE ONLY, OR EVEN THE MOST IMPORTANT,
ISSUE TO BE CONSIDERED. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE
TO GUESS WHAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED OR DECIDED BUT CLEARLY
WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF HOW THE VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS WERE WORKING IN PRACTICE. CONSIDERATIONS OF
SAFETY OR RELIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE
MIGHT ALSO HAVE ARISEN AND WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER
HOW WELL THE TREATY HAD SERVED OUR NON-PROLIFERATION
OBJECTIVES. WARNKE SAID IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO ENTER
INTO A TREATY OF INDEFINITE DURATION AND THIS WOULD NOT BE
AFFECTED BY THE DECISIONS OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.
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